Abstract: Cooperative game is a critical research area in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Global reward game is a subclass of cooperative games, where all agents aim to maximize cumulative global rewards. Credit assignment is an important problem studied in the global reward game. Most works stand by the view of non-cooperative-game theoretical framework with the shared reward approach, i.e., each agent is assigned a shared global reward directly. This, however, may give each agent an inaccurate feedback on his contribution to the group. In this paper, we introduce a cooperative-game theoretical framework and extend it to the finite-horizon case. We show that our proposed framework is a superset of the global reward game. Based on this framework, we propose an algorithm called Shapley Q-value policy gradient (SQPG) to learn a local reward approach that can distribute the cumulative global reward fairly, reflecting each agent's own contribution in contrast to the shared reward approach. We evaluate our method on the Cooperative Navigation, Prey-and-Predator and Traffic Junction, compared with MADDPG, COMA, Independent actor-critic and Independent DDPG. In the experiments, our algorithm shows better convergence than the baselines.
Introduction
Cooperative game is a critical research area in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Many real-life tasks can be modeled as cooperative games, e.g. the coordination of autonomous vehicles [1] , autonomous distributed logistics [2] and search-and-rescue robots [3, 4] . Global reward game [5] is a subclass of cooperative games where agents aim to maximize cumulative global rewards. In a global reward game, credit assignment is an important problem, which targets on finding a method to distribute the global reward. There are two categories of approaches to solve out this problem, namely shared reward approach (also known as shared reward game or fully cooperative game) [6, 7, 8] and local reward approach [9] . The shared reward approach assigns a single global reward to all agents. The local reward approach, on the other hand, distributes the global reward according to each agent's contribution, and turns out to have superior performances for many tasks [10, 11, 12] .
Whichever approach is adopted, a remaining open question is whether there is an underlying theory to explain the credit assignment. Conventionally, a global reward game is built upon non-cooperative game theory, which primarily aims to find Nash equilibrium as the stable solution [13, 14] . This formulation can be extended to a dynamic environment with finite horizons via stochastic game [15] . However, Nash equilibrium focuses on individual rewards and has no explicit incentives for cooperation. As a result, a shared reward function (equivalent to a potential function [16] ) has to be utilized to force cooperation, which leads to an explanation to the shared reward approach, but not the local reward approach.
In our work, we introduce the framework of cooperative game theory (or coalitional game theory) [17] in which the local reward approach becomes rationalized. In cooperative game theory, the objective is to divide coalitions and to bind agreements among agents who belong to the same coalition, which enables explicit cooperation. We focus on the convex game (CG), which is a typical game in cooperative game theory featuring the existence of a stable coalition structure and payoff distribution scheme called core. The payoff distribution is equivalent to credit assignment and the core thereby rationalizes the local reward approach [18] .
Referring to the concepts from stochastic games [15] , we extend CG to finite-horizon scenarios. We propose Shapley Q-value for credit assignment in the extended CG (ECG), and sample it for computational efficiency. Finally, we use the actor-critic framework [19] to learn decentralized policies [20] with a centralized critic [10, 21, 22] . The advantage of the proposed method is evaluated on the games of Cooperative Navigation, Prey-and-Predator [21] , and Traffic Junction [6] .
The main contributions of our work are: 1) we introduce CG from the framework of cooperative game theory to rationalize the motivation of the local reward approach; 2) we propose the ECG to extend CGs to dynamic environments with finite horizons; 3) we propose Shapley Q-value for credit assignment in ECG and use its sample-based approximation for computational efficiency.
Related Work
Multi-agent learning refers to a category of methods that tackle a game with multiple agents, e.g. a cooperative game. Among these methods, we only focus on using reinforcement learning to deal with a cooperative game, which is called multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Incredible progresses have recently been made on MARL. Some researchers [6, 8, 23 ] focus on distributed executions, which allow communications among agents. Others [5, 10, 12, 21, 22] consider decentralized executions, where no communication is permitted during the execution. Nevertheless, all of them study a global reward game with a centralized critic, which means information can be shared on the value function during training. In our work, we pay our attention to decentralized execution and centralized critic settings.
As opposed to competing with others, agents in a cooperative game aim to cooperate to solve a joint task or maximize global payoffs [17] . Shapley [15] proposed a non-cooperative game theoretical framework called stochastic game, which models the dynamics of multiple agents in the zero-sum game with finite horizons. Hu et al. [24] introduced a general-sum stochastic game theoretical framework, which does include the zero-sum game. To force cooperation under this framework, the potential function [16] is applied such that each agent shares the same objective, namely a global reward game [5] . In this paper, we use cooperative game theory whereas the existing cooperative game framework are built under non-cooperative game theory. Our framework gives a new view on global reward games and well explains how the credit assignment is important. We show that the global reward game is a subclass of our framework if we interpret such that the agents in the global reward game forms a grand coalition. Under our framework, it is more rational to use a local reward approach to distribute the global reward.
Credit assignment is a significant problem that has been studied in cooperative games for a long time. There are two sorts of credit assignment schemes, i.e., shared reward approach and local reward approach. The shared reward approach directly assigns each agent the global reward [6, 8, 23, 21] . We show that this is actually equivalent to distributing the global reward equally to individual agents. The global reward game with this credit assignment scheme is also called shared reward game (or fully cooperative game) [9] . However, Wolpert and Tumer [25] claimed that the shared reward approach does not give each agent the accurate contribution. Thus, it may not perform well in difficult problems. This motivates the study on the local reward approach, which distributes the global reward to agents according to their contributions. The existing question is how to quantify the contributions. To investigate the answer to this question, Chang et al. [5] attempted using Kalman filter to infer the contribution of each agent. Recently, Foerster et al. [10] , Zhang et al. [11] and Nguyen et al. [12] modelled the marginal contributions inspired by the reward difference [25] . Under our proposed framework, we propose a new algorithm to learn a local reward called Shapley value [26] , which is guaranteed to distribute the global reward fairly. Although Shapley value can be regarded as the expectation of the marginal contributions, it is different from the previous work: it considers all possible orders of agents to form a grand coalition, which has not been addressed in any of the prior work aforementioned.
Background
Convex Game (CG). Convex game is a typical game in the cooperative game theory. The definitions below are referred to [17] . A CG is formally represented as Γ = N , v , where N is the set of agents and v is the value function to measure the profits earned by a coalition. N itself is called the grand coalition. The value function v : 2 N → R is a mapping from a coalition C ⊆ N to a real number v(C). In a CG, its value function satisfies two properties, i.e., 1)
2) the coalitions are independent. The solution of a CG is a tuple (CS, x), where CS = {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C m } is a coalition structure and x = (x i ) i∈N indicates the payoffs distributed to each agent, which satisfies two conditions, i.e., 1) x i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N ; 2) x(C) ≤ v(C), ∀C ⊆ CS, where x(C) = i∈C x i . CS N denotes the set of all possible coalition structures. A core is the stable solution set of a CG, which can be defined mathematically as
The core of a CG ensures reasonable payoff distribution and inspires our work on credit assignment in MARL.
Shapley Value. Shapley value [26] is one of the most popular methods to solve the payoff distribution problem for a grand coalition [27, 28, 29] . Given a cooperative game Γ = (N , v), for any C ⊆ N \{i} let δ i (C) = v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C), then the Shapley value of each agent i can be written as:
Literally, Shapley value takes the average of the marginal contribution δ i (C) of possible coalitions, so that it satisfies: 1) efficiency: x(N ) = v(N ); 2) fairness: if an agent i has no contribution, then x i = 0; if i-th and j-th agents have the same contribution, then x i = x j [17] . As we can see from Eq.1, if we calculate the Shapley value for an agent, we have to consider 2 |N | − 1 possible coalitions that the agent could join in to form a grand coalition, which causes the computational catastrophe. We purpose mitigating this issue in the scenarios with finite horizons.
Multi-agent Actor-Critic. Different from the value based method, i.e., Q-learning [30] , Policy gradient [31] directly learns the policy by maximizing J(θ) = E s∼ρ π ,a∼π θ [r(s, a)], where r(s, a) is the reward of an arbitrary state-action pair. Since the gradient of J(θ) w.r.t. θ cannot be directly calculated, the policy gradient theorem [32] is used to approximate the gradient such that
In the actor-critic framework [19] , based on the policy gradient theorem, π θ (a|s) is called actor and Q π (s, a) is called critic.
, where T is a finite horizon. Extending to the multi-agent scenarios, the gradient of each agent i can be represented as
can be regarded as the estimation of the contribution of each agent i. If the deterministic policy [33] need to be learned in MARL problems, we can reformulate the approximated gradient of each agent as
4 Our Work
Extended Convex Game
We now extend CG to the scenarios with finite horizons and decisions, namely extended CG (ECG). The set of joint actions of agents is defined as A = × i∈N A i , where A i is the feasible action set for each agent i. S is the set of possible states in the environment. The dynamics of the environment is defined as P r(s |s, a), where s, s ∈ S and a ∈ A. Inspired by Nash [34] , we construct ECG by two stages. In stage 1, an oracle arranges the coalition structure and contracts the cooperation agreements, i.e., the credit assigned to an agent for his optimal long-term contribution if he joins in some coalitions. We assume that this oracle can observe the whole environment and be familiar with each agent's feature. In stage 2, after joining in the allocated coalition, each agent will further make a decision by π i (a i |s) to maximize the social value of its coalition, so that the optimal social value of each coalition and the individual credit assignment can be obtained. Mathematically, the optimal value of a coalition C ∈ CS can be written as
, where a i ∈ A i and s ∈ S; π C = × i∈C π i ; r t (C) is the reward gained by coalition C at each time step. Therefore, each coalition can be regarded as a stochastic game [15] , but with credit assignment approach other than the shared reward approach. We denote the joint policy of the whole agents as π = × i∈N π i (a i |s). Since constructing coalitions and binding agreements in stage 1 is independent of the decision process defined in stage 2, the formula
Here, we assume that each agent can observe the global state. Theorem 1. With the efficient payoff distribution scheme, for an extended convex game (ECG), one solution in the core must exist with the grand coalition and the objective is max π v π ({N }), which can lead to the maximal social welfare, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix B.
Compare ECG with Global Reward Game
As seen from Theorem 1, an ECG with a grand coalition and an efficient payoff distribution scheme is actually equivalent to a global reward game. Here, we think that the agents in a global reward game are regarded as a grand coalition. We consequently draw a conclusion that the maximal global welfare can be achieved in a global reward game by the view of ECG. This gives a theoretical justification on the motivation to solve a global reward game. Meanwhile, we can solve a global reward game instead of ECG when we aim to find the stable solution with a grand coalition. In the rest of paper, we will focus on how to solve out a global reward game with local reward approach.
Look into Shared Reward Approach by the View of ECG
Shared reward approach assigns each agent the global reward directly in a global reward game. Each agent unilaterally maximizes the cumulative global rewards to seek his optimal policy such that
where r t (N ) is the global reward and π = × i∈N π i [9] . If v π ({N }) is multiplied by a normalizing factor, i.e., 1/|N |, then the objective of the new optimization problem for each agent i should be equivalent to Eq.2. We can express it mathematically as
πi i∈N
Then, the credit assigned to each agent in shared reward approach is actually x i = v π ({N })/|N |, and the sum of the whole agents' credits is equal to the cumulative global rewards. It suffices the condition of the efficient payoff distribution scheme. Therefore, we show that shared reward approach is a special case of ECG with a grand coalition and the efficient payoff distribution scheme. To clarify the concepts we mentioned before, we draw a Venn diagram shown as Fig.1 .
Shapley Q-value
As discussed above, we know that solving an ECG with an efficient payoff distribution scheme is actually equivalent to solving a global reward game . Whereas shared reward approach involves an efficient payoff distribution scheme, it has been shown that local reward approach gives faster convergence rates [35, 36] . For this reason, we attempt to use Shapley value, a local reward approach to complete the credit assignment. Because v π C (C ) represents the cumulative global rewards earned by coalition C in an ECG, we can model it as a Q-value, i.e., Q π C (s, a C ), where s are the states and a C = (a i ) i∈C . According to Eq.1, the Shapley Q-value of each agent i, i.e., Q Φi (s, a i ) can be written such that
Approximate Marginal Contribution
As seen from Eq.4 and 5, it is clear that we need to access the environment repeatedly each time step to measure the value functions of different coalitions and to calculate different marginal contributions Φ i (C). To mitigate this problem, we propose a method called Approximate Marginal Contribution (AMC) to estimate the marginal contribution of each coalition directly. Besides, we need to access the environment just once at each time step.
In cooperative game theory, each agent is assumed to join the grand coalition sequentially. |C|!(|N |− |C| − 1)!/|N |! in Eq.1, denoted as P r(C|N \{i}) is interpreted as that an agent randomly joins in an existing coalition (which can be empty) C to form a complete grand coalition with subsequent agents [17] . With this interpretation, we model a function to approximate the marginal contribution directly such thatΦ
where S is the state space; C is the ordered coalition that agent i would like to join in; A C∪{i} = (A j ) j∈C∪{i} , and the actions are ordered. For example, if the order of a coalition is (0, 2), then a C∪{1} = (a 0 , a 2 , a 1 ). In practice, we represent a C∪{i} by the concatenation of each agent's action vector. To keep the input size ofΦ i (s, a C∪{i} ) constant in different cases, we fix the actions as the concatenation of all agents' actions and mask irrelevant agents' actions with zeros.
Approximate Shapley Q-value
Followed by the interpretation above, Shapley Q-value can be rewritten as
Analogously to the derivation of Q-learning from Bellman equation [32] , we can also sample Q Φi (s, a i ) here. Combined with AMC, we can write the equation of the approximate Shapley Q-value (ASQ) asQ
Shapley Q-value Policy Gradient
In an ECG with an efficient payoff distribution scheme and a grand coalition, each agent only needs to maximize his own creditQ Φi (s, a i ) so that max π v π (N ) can be achieved as
Therefore, if we show that max πiQ Φi (s, a i ) for each agent i is approached, then we can show that the maximal social welfare max π v π (N ) can be met. Now, the problem transfers to how to solve max πiQ Φi (s, a i ) for each agent i. We have shown that global reward game is actually a potential game 2 , and an ECG with the efficient payoff distribution scheme and a grand coalition is equivalent to a global reward game. Moreover, Monderer and Shapley [16] showed that in a potential game there exists a pure Nash equilibrium. For these reasons, we apply deterministic policy gradient (DPG) [37] to find out an optimal policy. If we substitute Shapley Q-value for Q π i (s, a i ) in DPG, we can directly write the policy gradient of each agent i such that
whereQ Φi (s, a i ) is the ASQ for agent i and µ θi is agent i's deterministic policy, parameterized by θ i . Since in a global reward game only a global reward is received each time step, we cannot use it to update the ASQs (consisted of AMCs). However, benefited by the property of efficiency we can update the ASQs according to the minimization problem such that
whereQ Φi ωi (s, a i ) is parameterized by ω i and r(N ) is the global reward received from the environment each time step. By this update, the approximate Shapley Q-value is constrained and efficient. Therefore, the condition stated in Theorem 1 is guaranteed. Because Shapley Q-value takes all of possible agents' actions and states as input, our algorithm actually uses the centralized critic. Nonetheless, the policy is decentralized in execution.
Silver et al. [37] showed that DPG has the familiar machinery of policy gradient. Besides, Sutton et al. [32] emphasized that with a small learning rate, policy gradient algorithm can converge to a local optimum. Therefore, we can conclude that with a small learning rate, each agent can find a local maximizer and the global value v π (N ) converges to a local maximum. Since our algorithm aims to find optimal policies by Shapley Q-values, we call it Shapley Q-value policy gradient (SQPG).
Implementation
In the implementation, for the sake of better approximation on policy gradients by off-policy and the powerful function approximation by deep neural networks, we use the deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) method [33] . Additionally, we apply the reparameterization technique called gumbel-softmax trick [38] to deal with discrete action space. The pseudo code for the algorithm SQPG is given in Appendix A.
Experiments
We evaluate the performance of SQPG on Cooperative Navigation, Prey and Predator and Traffic Junction. The environments of Cooperative Navigation and Prey-and-Predator are from Mordatch and Abbeel [39] , and Traffic Junction from Sukhbaatar et al. [6] . Cooperative Navigation is originally a global reward game. To enable Traffic Junction to be a global reward game, we modify the reward to the sum of each agent's reward. Besides, we let prey in Prey-and-Predator be a random agent, as part of the environment, and we can only control predators in the game. Additionally, all of predators receive the sum of each agent's reward in the original environment. Henceforth, Preyand-Predator becomes a global reward game. In the experiments, we compare our algorithm with two Independent algorithms, DDPG [33] and actor-critic (AC) [19] , as well as two methods with a centralised critic, MADDPG [21] and COMA [10] . The Independent algorithms are implemented with decentralized execution and decentralized training.
Cooperative Navigation
In this task, there are 3 agents and 3 targets. Each agent aims to move to a target, with no prior allocation of targets to each agent. The state of each agent in this environment includes his current position and velocity, the displacement to three targets, and the displacement to other agents. The action space of each agent is move up, move down, move right, move left and stay. In this environment, collision is not allowed. If it happen, then the global reward will be reduced by 1. Additionally, the global reward also considers the negative sum of the distance between each target and the nearest agent to it.
As seen from Fig.2a shows the mean rewards per episode during the training procedure for Cooperative Navigation with 3 agents. Fig.2b and Fig.2c records the trails of agents to targets for two random selected scenarios by SQPG with sample size of 1. Each agent starts from one of colour circles, moving along the corresponding dashed lines to one of three targets, drawn by small black circles. Predator with 3 predators by SQPG with sample size of 1. Fig.3b and Fig.3c shows the trails of predators and prey. Predators start from the red rectangles and finalize at the red circles whereas prey starts from the green rectangle and stops at the green circle.
converges faster than the baselines at different time points. As the sample size becomes larger, theoretically it can approach the accurate Shapley Q-value faster. This explains why the convergence rate becomes faster earlier when the sample size is larger. Therefore, our result supports the arguments that local reward approach converges faster [35, 36] . Since we show that SQPG with the sample size of 1 can finally obtain the same performance as other variants, we just run it in the rest experiments to reduce the computational complexity. Fig.2b and 2c show the movement dynamics of agents in two random selected scenarios by SQPG with the sample size of 1. In different scenarios, each agent plays with different strategies to move to a target and avoid collisions with others. As we mentioned above, each agent knows the position of each target and the displacement to other agents according to the initial state. Therefore, each of them can decide a target to move to so that the collision with other agents can be as much as avoided in future. We believe that this is because the accurate credit assignment by Shapley Q-value during the training procedure enables agents to well estimate the contribution of each decision to the team given other agents' information. Thus, each agent can decide a strategy for the later movements to maximize the profits of the team.
Prey-and-Predator
In this task, there are three predators that we can control and prey is set to a random agent. The aim of predators is using the least steps to capture the prey. The state of each predator contains his current position and velocity, the displacement to prey and other predators, and the velocity of prey. The action space is the same as that defined in Cooperative Navigation. The global reward of predators are the negative minimal distance between any predator and the prey. In addition, if the prey is caught by any predator, then the global reward is added by 10. Once the prey is caught, this episode terminates.
As seen from Fig.3a , SQPG leads the board during the training procedure, with about 30 turns to capture the prey finally. Similar to Cooperative Navigation, we also select two random cases to show the movement dynamics of agents. Fig.3b and 3c demonstrate the movement dynamics of agents in two random selected scenarios by SQPG with sample size of 1. As shown in Fig.3b , we can observe that predators learn to surround the prey. Observing from Fig.3c , predators still attempt to surround the prey, but in this scenario the prey is captured midway. Comparing these two scenarios, it is shown quite clear that at least one predator is in charge of moving towards the start point of the prey. Meanwhile, a predator is responsible for predicting the possible movement of the prey and moving towards the estimated position that he can catch the prey. This validates the hypothesis we stated in Cooperative Navigation that Shapley Q-value is advantageous for maximizing the profits of team.
Traffic Junction
In this task, cars move along the predefined routes which intersect on one or more traffic junctions. At each time step, new cars are added to the environment with probability p arrive , and the total number of cars is limited below N max . After a car finishes its mission, it will be removed from the environment and possibly sampled back to a new route. Each car has a limited vision of 1, which means it can only observe the circumstance within the 3x3 region surrounding it. No communication between cars is permitted in our experiment, in contrast to the others' experiments on the same task [6, 23] . The action space of each car is gas and brake, and the reward function is a linear penalty of time −0.01t, where t is the time steps that a car is continuously active on the road in one mission. Additionally, if a collision occur, the reward will be reduced by 10. We evaluate the performance by the success rate, i.e., the steps that no collisions happen. We compare our method with baselines on the easy, medium and hard version of Traffic Junction. The easy version is constituted of one traffic junction of two one-way roads on a 7 × 7 grid with N max = 5 and p arrive = 0.3. The medium version is constituted of one traffic junction of two-way roads on a 14 × 14 grid with N max = 10 and p arrive = 0.2. The hard version is constituted of four connected traffic junctions of two-way roads on a 18 × 18 grid with N max = 20 and p arrive = 0.05. From Tab.1, we can see that on the easy version, except for Independent AC, other algorithms can get a success rate over 93%, since this scenario is too easy. On the medium and hard version, SQPG outperforms the other baselines with the success rate of 88.98% on the medium version and 87.04% on the hard version. Moreover, the performance of SQPG significantly exceeds the performance of no-communication algorithms reported as 84.9% and 74.1% in [23] . We demonstrate that SQPG can also solve out large scale problems.
Discussion
In the experimental results, it is surprised that Independent DDPG achieved a good performance. The reason could be that a potential game can be solved by fictitious play [16] and DDPG is analogous to it, finding an optimal deterministic policy. However, the convergence rate is not guaranteed when the number of agents becomes large. The bad performance of COMA could be due to the complicated model it has so that the convergence in a continuous control problem, e.g. Cooperative Navigation and Prey-and-Predator becomes difficult.
Conclusion
We introduce cooperative game theory to extend the existing global reward game to a broader framework called extended convex game (ECG). Under this framework, we rationalize the local reward approach and propose an algorithm named Shapley Q-value policy gradient (SQPG) to learn a sort of local reward called Shapley Q-value, which is guaranteed to distribute the global reward fairly to each agent. We evaluate SQPG in variant scenarios of global reward game and show the promising performance compared with baselines. In the future work, we plan to dynamically group the agents at each time step with theoretical guarantees and jump out of the restriction of the global reward game.
As we defined before, in an ECG, after allocating coalitions each agent will further maximize the cumulative rewards of his coalition by the optimal policy. Now, we denote the optimal value of an arbitrary coalition C as v
, where π C = × i∈C π i . Similarly, we can define the optimal value given an arbitrary coalition structure CS as v * (CS) = C∈CS v * (C). If we re-write the value function defined above, ECG can be reformulated to CG. For this reason, we can directly use the results in Lemma 1 here to complete the proof.
First, we aim to show that (i) In an ECG, with an efficient payoff distribution scheme x, v * ({N }) ≥ v * (CS ) for any CS ∈ CS N , and ({N }, x) is a solution in the core.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ({N }, x) is not in the core, but due to statement (1) in Lemma 1, there must exist a coalition structure CS other than {N } satisfies the result that (CS,x) is in the core. According to statement (2) in Lemma 1, since CG is a subclass of characteristic function games, under an efficient payoff distribution scheme we can get that
On the other hand, because of the property of ECG, i.e.,
we have that
. . (We further expand the terms similarly)
By Eq.12 and 14, we can get that
According to the condition of efficient payoff distribution scheme, we can write:
By Eq.15, we can get that
By Eq.18, it is obvious that we can always find out a payoff distribution scheme x =x for the grand coalition {N }. Since (CS,x) is presumed to be in the core, ({N },x) must satisfy the conditions of core. As a result, we derive that ({N }, x) (where x =x) is a solution in the core which contradicts the presumption we made and we show that proposition (i) holds.
Then, we aim to show that (ii) In an ECG, with an efficient payoff distribution scheme, the objective is max π v π ({N }).
The objective of a CG is finding a solution in the core. According to (i), max CS∈CS N v * (CS) is equivalent to finding a solution in the core corresponding to the grand coalition {N }. For this reason, we can write
Therefore, we prove (ii).
According to (ii), we can conclude that in an ECG, the objective is maximizing v π ({N }), i.e., the cumulative global rewards. However, an efficient payoff distribution scheme, e.g. Shapley value should be a precondition, otherwise, max π v π ({N }) <v({N }), wherev({N }) is the theoretically optimal value that can be found with an efficient payoff distribution scheme.
C Non-cooperative Game Theory
To clarify why we are interested in the framework of cooperative game theory, let us begin with non-cooperative game theory. The non-cooperative game theory aims to solve out problem, in which agents should be selfish and intelligent [13] . In other words, each agent only considers maximizing his own reward. Nash equilibrium would be a local optimum where no agent can achieve a greater reward with unilateral actions. Therefore, the non-cooperative game theory is not suitable to model cooperative scenarios. One possible way to model the cooperative scenarios is through constructing a global function e.g. potential function [16] that replaces each individual reward function, such that each agent's objective is forced to be identical, i.e., fully cooperative game. Even if each agent is only keen on maximizing his own reward, the cooperation can also be formed. Nonetheless, this framework has its own limitation. Firstly, although theoretically potential function can be decomposed to the individual reward to each agent, it is difficult to find a proper decomposition under the framework of non-cooperative game. Secondly, it is difficult to explain how the coalition is formed if we assume that only agents within a coalition can cooperate. These two defects of the noncooperative game theoretical framework motivates us to investigate and introduce the framework under cooperative game theory.
D Experimental Settings
As for the settings of experiments, because different environments may involve variant complexity and dynamics, we set different hyperparameters for each task. Except that COMA claims to use GRU as hidden layer, any other algorithms uses MLP as hidden layer for policy network. All of policy networks only use one hidden layer. About critic networks, every algorithm uses MLP with one hidden layer. For each experiment, we keep learning rate, entropy regularization coefficient, update frequency, batch size and the number of hidden units identical on each model. In experiments, each agent has his own state in execution, while in training agents share states. The rest details of experimental settings are shown as below. All of models are trained by Adam Optimizer [41] with default hyperparameters.
D.1 Details of Cooperative Navigation
As we introduced in Sec.5.1, Cooperative Navigation is an environment with 3 agents and 3 targets. Each agent aims to move to a target with no assignment of target and no collision. In this section, we provide the details of training details and extra results.
Training Details. As we mentioned above, we keep hyperparameters fixed in order to achieve a fair comparison between algorithms. Tab.2 lists part of hyperparameters used in Cooperative Navigation. The rest hyperparameters, i.e, replay buffer size, grad cliping can be tuned specifically to achieve the best results for variant models.
Additional Results. In this section, we show more movement dynamics shown as Fig.4 . 
D.2 Details of Prey-and-Predator
As we introduced in Sec.5.2, Prey-and-Predator is an environment with 4 agents, where 3 predators are in the same alliance chasing the prey. In this game, we only control the predators to cooperate to catch the prey controlled by a random policy.In this section, we provide the details of training details and extra results.
Training Details. As we mentioned above, we keep hyperparameters fixed in order to achieve a fair comparison between algorithms. Tab.3 lists part of hyperparameters used in Cooperative Navigation. The rest hyperparameters, i.e, replay buffer size, grad cliping can be tuned specifically to achieve the best results for variant models. Additional Results. In this section, we show more movement dynamics shown as Fig.5 .
D.3 Details of Traffic Junction
As we introduced in Sec.5.3, there are three different difficulty levels in Traffic Junction. In the more difficult level, the number of cars, arrival probability, number of traffic junctions and grid size are upgraded. Moreover, more entry points are added so that the environment become more complex when the level is harder. For each entry point, there are multiple choices of routes for cars. We list details of the setting of this experiment in Tab.4. Moreover, to give readers a more clear sight, we show Fig.6 to visualize the environment. Training Details. As we mentioned above, we keep hyperparameters fixed in order to achieve a fair comparison between algorithms. Tab.5 lists part of hyperparameters used in Traffic Junction. The rest hyperparameters, i.e, replay buffer size, grad cliping can be tuned specifically to achieve the best results for variant models.
Additional Results. We run 1000 episodes to evaluate the trained models and report the mean success rate. The mean success rate is defined as the mean of the success frequencies. If there is no collision in a step, then the success frequency is denoted by 1, otherwise, the success rate is denoted by 0. The evaluation result is reported in Tab.1. We also report the mean reward per episode during the training procedure to understand the learning performance, shown as Fig.7 . From this figure, we can see that SQPG has a faster convergence rate compared with baselines.
E Limitations on Extended Convex Game
In this paper, we proposed a framework built on cooperative game theory called extended convex game (ECG). Although ECG has extended the framework of global reward game defined upon noncooperative game theory to a broader scope, there exist some limitations to this model. Firstly, we have to assume that there is an oracle scheduling the coalition initially, however, this oracle is The orange arrows represent the available routes at each entry point. The green lines separate the two-way roads. difficult to realize in implementation. Even if this oracle can be implemented, this model still cannot solve out some problems with random perturbations. This is due to the fact that this oracle has assigned each agent to a coalition with the environment that he knows. Obviously, the perturbation exceeds his knowledge. To deal with this problem, we may investigate how to enable the coalition construction dynamically in the future work. The intuitive idea is enabling the oracle to learn a policy for scheduling the coalition from the history information. At each step, he uses the learned policy to divide the coalitions. Then, each agent act within the coalition to maximize the social value of the coalition. This process can be repeated infinitely. Nonetheless, the promising convergence under the cooperative game theoretical framework for this complicated process could be a challenge.
